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EFFECTS OF TOMMY JOHN SURGERY, DRAFT ORDER, AND MONETARY FACTORS
ON THE VALUE OF PITCHERS IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

Abstract

By Jonathan Paul Wong
University of the Pacific
2022

The purpose of this thesis is to determine what effects draft order, monetary earnings, and
Tommy John Surgery (TJS) have on the perceived value of a pitcher in Major League Baseball
(MLB). For the context of this thesis, value will be defined as a player’s ability to contribute to
their team’s wins in a positive manner. TJS has become synonymous with MLB and baseball as
a sport, and many are either skeptical of its effects or over-assuming of its benefits. The three
aforementioned areas of concerns were used to structure the thesis, as each dependent outcome is
analyzed in a chapter of its own. Multiple articles and studies pertaining to the effects draft
order, financial earnings, and TJS may have on pitcher value were compiled and analyzed.
Looking at studies between pitchers who underwent TJS prior to being drafted, their order by
which they are picked by a team is not as affected as assumed, but the pitcher is more likely to
return to the disabled/injured list during their career in MLB. A lens of economic value saw that
pitchers who were paid more added to their teams’ respective wins. However, the financial loss
caused by a pitcher missing time to recover from TJS could outweigh the cost of wins. From a
purely Tommy-John standpoint, there are significant changes both beneficial and detrimental to a
pitcher’s overall statistics. Further research and personal knowledge should be explored prior to
receiving TJS as a pitcher. Overall, the factor of TJS seems to have a slightly negative influence
on the other two factors and an overall stronger influence than draft order or monetary earnings.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

From its conception in 1876 to the present, Major League Baseball (MLB) has captivated
audiences and entertained the masses of the United States of America and the world itself
(History.com). As a sport contingent on perceived unpredictability, baseball scientists and
spectators alike will often bridge the gap between projected and actual outcomes with
misconceptions rooted in different unknowns. Of the multiple confounding variables, three
major factors have seemed to become synonymous with pitcher value in baseball: amateur draft
order, financial earnings, and ulnar collateral ligament (UCL) reconstruction surgery, also known
as Tommy John surgery.
Efforts in quantitative data collection and analysis in MLB performance statistics have
been made to help dispel some of these misunderstandings. The first comprehensive reference
book of baseball statistics, “The Baseball Encyclopedia: The Complete and Official Record of
Major League Baseball,” was published by Macmillan in 1969 and dubbed “Big Mac” after the
publisher’s name and the alleged 6.5-pound weight of the first edition (Neyer, 2017). In August
of 1971, the Society of Baseball Research, or SABR, was founded as an organization to extend
and update the research that “Big Mac” pioneered to do, going so far as to naming the field of
baseball analytics “sabermetrics” (SABR, 2022).
Through its members’ endeavors, SABR would use “Big Mac” as the foundation for
research-based books and references about baseball statistics, including the databases baseballreference.com and fangraphs.com, Michael Lewis’ book “Moneyball,” and the statistic of wins
above replacement, or WAR. These resources comprise most of the background information and
data used to research the three unknowns and their effects on the value of a pitcher in
MLB. Value of a pitcher in MLB will be quantified as a pitcher’s performance-based and
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statistical contributions towards their individual success and their respective team’s overall
success.
Although the game of baseball itself has evolved since the days of simply jotting down
statistics on paper, sabermetrics has compensated for the advance in recording skill and statistics
to account for the physical and performance-based advancement. From baseball writers and
analysts to medical doctors, many use the databases and resources to create studies revolving
around physiological factors that may affect the pitcher’s performance statistics beneficially or
detrimentally. Despite the growth in literature accessible to those interested in baseball statistics,
blanks and gaps in what is known often has led to the perpetuity of the unknowns.
After the first amateur draft in 1965, no one has been able to accurately determine if a
pitcher being drafted with a higher pick or in a higher round will perform better than a pitcher in
a lower round or with a lower pick. The managerial mindset of Moneyball created in 2002
questioned MLB teams and ownerships on their behaviors and approaches to financial
expenditures and contracts given to players. Since the invention and application of Tommy John
surgery, many studies have been initiated to find definitive and significant evidence that the
surgery makes a pitcher perform better overall.
This thesis hopes to take that existing wealth of baseball statistics and sabermetrics to
help clarify the three unknowns and help dispel the broad misconceptions used to patch the gaps
between literature and what is publicly known about pitcher value and its relationships with draft
order, financial earnings, and TJS. Through the research compartmentalized by chapters, each
variable will be assessed in its positive and negative effects on an MLB pitcher’s value.
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CHAPTER 2: DRAFT ORDER AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR OF VALUE

Introduction
Prior to 1965, MLB teams would scout and scour the country on a first-come, first-served
basis to recruit young high school and collegiate players to their minor-league affiliates and
eventually to their major-league teams. The minor-league teams, often referred to as teams’ farm
systems, foster the skills of the drafted players and provide their major-league affiliations with
new players and reserves for their active rosters. With the first-come, first-served ideal, the
wealthier teams with more personnel and resources could collect all the top young talent before
smaller teams with less payroll could have an opportunity to even observe them. The amateur
draft was invented in 1965 to give losing teams a better chance at acquiring high-school and
collegiate players with more value and potential to succeed at the major-league level (Manuel,
2010). The draft was initially structured so that each team had picks in the first round of the
draft, with some supplementary picks given to different teams under certain circumstances based
on team performance on contractual obligations. The teams would continue picking amateur
players until a capacity was reached; the 1965 draft had 824 picks in 72 rounds, while the most
recent draft in 2021 had 222 picks over seven rounds.
Once a player is drafted and signs a professional contract, that player is assigned to a
minor-league team affiliated with the major-league team for which the player was drafted. The
league levels ascend from rookie ball (Rk) to single-A level (A), double-A level (AA), and
triple-A league (AAA). Most times, if not all the time, drafted amateur players are assigned to
an Rk-league affiliate. As the player progresses in skill, that player will get promoted semisequentially until they reach the AAA level. Minor league-level statistics are not definitively
indicative of a player’s pre-draft statistics, but in terms of pre-Major League Baseball statistics, it
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is easier to uniformly compile and objectively compare minor-league statistics to MLB statistics
than amateur or pre-draft statistics.
Scouting reports of the players about to be drafted and the draft itself usually adds
misconception to player value. Players picked in the first round are thought to have more
performance-based success in the MLB than players drafted in subsequent rounds. For example,
here are career statistics and averages from some of the pitchers drafted in 1965, provided by
Baseball-Reference.com:
Pitcher 1: 0.400 W%, 3.70 ERA, 0.8299 K/IP, -0.3 WAR, -0.10 WAR/season for 3yrs
Pitcher 2: 0.526 W%, 3.19 ERA, 1.0609 K/IP, 83.6 WAR, 3.10 WAR/season for 27yrs
Pitcher 1 was drafted with the second overall pick during the first round of the 1965 draft and the
first pitcher drafted that year. Pitcher 2 is Nolan Ryan, the 226th overall pick in the 12th round
of the 1965 draft. The latter pitcher, despite not being considered for the MLB until the doubledigit rounds of the draft, went on to become the all-time leader in strikeouts and no-hitters, and
he is considered to be one of the greatest pitchers in MLB history (National Baseball Hall of
Fame). Statistics categories have since been developed for MLB players to assist in predicting
performance outputs. Scouts who observe players before the draft may not have a large-enough
sample size to fully evaluate a player’s projected career performance.
Many variables contribute to the assumption of a pitcher’s future successes or failures in
a professional career. Scouts will often look to pitching-based outcomes for a superficial
summary of value, like a pre-drafted pitcher’s surgical history and/or fastball velocity. Although
many surgeries can affect the physiological performance and draft value of a pitcher, Tommy
John surgery stands out as the procedure with the most misconception surrounding its
consequences, including one regarding its effect on fastball velocity. A poll ran by Dr. Chris
Ahmad of the New York Yankees and reported on by physical therapist Dr. Mike Reinold found
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that within the sample, 32% of high school players, 53% of college pitchers, 33% of the players’
coaches, and 36% of the players’ parents believed that velocity would increase as a result of
Tommy John surgery (Reinold, 2014).
About half of the potential recruits and the potential recruits’ coaches for the minorleague affiliates of Major League Baseball teams and a third of the coaches overseeing them
believe that UCL reconstruction can make the pitchers pitch at a higher velocity than their initial
velocity. This way of thinking could make them look more attractive to professional scouts from
different Major League Baseball organizations and increase their value in the drafts that recruit
them into different teams’ farm systems. On the other hand, amateur-draft scouts may have
reservations about drafting a pitcher who had a particular procedure done prior playing in MLB.
Review of Literature and Methods
In my initial exploration of the topic, I analyzed the difference in performance between
first-round pitchers’ performances at the minor-league level and at the major-league level. I
created a database consisting of 1,000 pitchers from the amateur draft with at least 3 complete
seasons of play in the MLB. Terra et al. ran analyses for the study and found that 404 of the
subjects were picked in the first round, while 396 of the subjects were drafted after the 2000
season. The total sample and subsamples of pitchers were created by coarsened exact matching
(CEM). The subsamples divided the pitchers by draft status (i.e., first round) and number of
seasons in the MLB that the subjects played. Through SPSS Statistics, linear regression models
evaluated the MiLB and MLB-career performances of the pitchers in the sample and tested the
effect of draft pick order on outcomes. Dependent variables in these tests included the following
statistics: earned-run average (ERA), ERA+, unearned/earned runs allowed per 9 innings (RA9),
winning percentage, fielding-independent pitching (FIP), and K/9, or strikeouts per 9 innings
(Terra et al., 2022a).
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A player’s RA9 factors in all runs a pitcher is responsible for, both earned and
unearned. A pitcher may acquire an unearned run if an opposing runner from the previous
pitcher scores or if an error occurs by the pitcher’s defense that allows the opposing team to
score a run. Calculating RA9 is nearly identical to calculating ERA with the addition of
unearned run totals to earned run totals prior to multiplying that sum by the 9-factor and dividing
that product by the innings pitched. A modified metric of ERA, ERA+ is calculated by
normalizing a player’s earned-run average and factoring in differing ballparks or opposing
batters’ effects on ERA, converting it into a measure comparable to a league ERA based on the
average MLB ERA (designated an ERA+ of 100). By that metric, a player with an ERA+ of 90
would have a personal ERA 10% less than the league average, whereas a player with an ERA+
of 201 would have a personal ERA 101% greater than league average. Strikeouts per nine
innings (K/9), calculated by multiplying a pitcher’s K/IP by 9, is the average of strikeouts a
pitcher may accrue in the average number of innings in a baseball game, or nine innings.
Most of the literature regarding how draft order affects value is associated with pre-draft
injuries and how it affects pitchers’ paths to careers in MLB and their longevity once they get to
the Major-League level. Some pitchers who have played in the MLB received UCL
reconstruction surgery prior to being drafted, either from necessity or as a preventive measure
and potentially to enhance performance, according to the misconception. A study published in
The American Journal of Sports Medicine analyzed the performance and injury track record of
MLB pitchers that received Tommy John surgery prior to being drafted (Wymore et al.,
2016). Performance statistics analyzed included pitch velocities and cumulative averages of the
pitchers’ careers, annual values, and per-inning values. Injury statistics that were observed
included risk of future injury by instances when a player was placed on the disabled list
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(DL). The term “disabled list” is used in this study. To note, the term was updated prior to the
2019 season and renamed the “injured list (IL)” (Passan, 2019).
Results and Discussion
From Terra et al.’s descriptive statistics processed by SPSS Statistics on my database, the
subjects in the analyzed groups averaged 10.1 ± 4.4 years in the minor-league baseball (MiLB)
system and 8.0 ± 2.8 years in the MLB. Linear regression models were run holding the year of
the draft and the type of pitcher (starter, reliever, starter-reliever, closer) constant as potential
confounding variables. The table below illustrates the changes in statistics from first-round
pitchers compared to pitchers picked in subsequent rounds (Terra et al., 2022a).

Table 1
Significant results of Terra et al. linear regression models
Variable

Change in points

95% CI

P

MiLB_ERA

+0.233

0.153 to 0.313

<0.001

MLB_ERA

+0.386

0.304 to 0.469

<0.001

MiLB_RA9

+0.217

0.129 to 0.306

<0.001

MLB_RA9

+0.398

0.308 to 0.489

<0.001

MiLB_W% (pct_pts)

-2.239

-3.393 to -1.085

<0.001

MLB_W% (pct_pts)

-2.435

-3.466 to -1.405

<0.001

MLB_ERA+

-8.304

-10.333 to -6.275

<0.001

MLB_FIP

+0.244

0.175 to 0.312

<0.001

MLB_K/9

-0.302

-0.492 to -0.113

0.002

The linear regression models showed that on average, the first-round subjects had a
higher increase of ERA and RA9 at the Major-League level than at the minor-league level
compared to subjects drafted in following rounds (+0.233 in minors vs +0.386 in MLB, P <
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0.001 and +0.217 in the minors vs 0.398 in MLB, P < 0.001). Those results indicate that the
study’s first-round subjects allowed more runs, earned and unearned, during their MLB careers
compared to subjects drafted in subsequent rounds. Subjects drafted in the first round also had a
higher decrease in win percentage in the MLB (-2.435 percentage points, P < 0.001) than in the
MiLB (-2.239 percentage points, P < 0.001) compared to pitchers drafted in the later rounds.
Following those analyses, a second round of linear regressions was processed, retaining
subjects drafted after the year 2000 to account for potentially updated approaches to the drafting
strategies (n=396). The direction of every relationship observed in the first linear regressions
was preserved in following models. Significance was retained for the following statistics: MiLB
ERA (p = 0.016), MLB ERA (p < 0.001), MiLB RA9 (p = 0.078), MLB RA9 (p<0.001), MLB
ERA+ (p = 0.002), MLB FIP (p = 0.001), and MLB K/9 (p = 0.045). The differences are
statistically significant from a P-value perspective and a baseball context. For example, the
difference in MLB ERA+ (-8.304, P < 0.001) between first-round pitchers and subsequent-round
pitchers could be the difference between a below-average ERA+ of 92 or an above-average
ERA+ of 108.
From the drafts that took place between 2006 to 2010 in the Wymore et al. study, 38
pitchers were identified to have had Tommy John surgery before being drafted by a major-league
team (UCLR group), with an additional 114 pitchers chosen to comprise the control group. Each
control-group pitcher was chosen within 30 picks of a given pitcher in the UCLR group and
matched for height and weight, with three control-group pitchers picked for each UCLR-group
pitcher. Statistics were run using SPSS Statistics version 12 to calculate means and frequencies
for the group, while two different types of tests were run to compare the performance and injury
statistics of the UCLR group and the control group: chi-squared tests for categorical data and
independent-samples t tests for continuous data. Continuous variables with abnormal
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distributions also underwent Mann-Whitney U tests. For all the tests, significance was set at P <
0.05. (Wymore et. al, 2016).
On average, the UCLR group was 21.8 ± 1.2 years of age and measured at 74.5 ± 2.3
inches and 209.6 ± 18.3 lbs. The control group measured at 21.4 ± 1.3 years of age, 74.3 ± 2.0
inches of height, and weighed in at 203.5 ± 15.7 lbs. P-values for age (0.050), height (0.612),
and weight (0.046) were found using the descriptives analyses. Below are transcribed tables
including significant and insignificant statistical findings from the tests run on the subject groups
in the Wymore et al. study.

Table 2
Pitch Velocity in miles per hour, based off study’s Table 6 (Wymore et al., 2016)
Velocity

UCLR

Control

P Value

Average (mean ± SD)

92.7 ± 2.0

92.1 ± 2.3

0.148

Maximum (mean ± SD)

93.1 ± 2.6

92.4 ± 2.8

0.257

Note. Reproduced with permission from Dr. Lucas Wymore.

Table 3
Selected Performance Statistics per Inning, based off study’s Table 9 (Wymore et al., 2016)
Statistic per Year

UCLR

Control

P Value

Runs, median (range)

0.52 (0.32 - 1.60)

0.54 (0.22 - 1.15)

0.432

Home runs allowed, median
(range)

0.07 (0.02 - 0.20)

0.08 (0.00 - 0.18)

0.022

Walked, median (range)

0.43 (0.19 - 1.00)

0.36 (0.19 - 1.22)

0.066

Struck batters, median
(range)

0.05 (0.00 - 0.10)

0.06 (0.00 - 0.21)

0.189

Note. Reproduced with permission from Dr. Lucas Wymore.
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Table 4
Risk of Future Injury, based off study’s Table 10 (Wymore et al., 2016)
Future Injury

UCLR

Control

P Value

33/38 (86.8)

73/114 (64.0)

0.008

103.0 (10-521)

94.0 (7-668)

0.316

DL for elbow, n/N (%)

15/33 (45.5)

32/73 (43.8)

0.877

Tear or retear, n/N (%)

4/38 (10.5)

18/114 (15.8)

0.425

DL assignment, n/N (%)
Days on DL, median (range)

Note. Reproduced with permission from Dr. Lucas Wymore.

The significant findings appear to be that of the difference between home runs allowed
per inning (P=0.022) and IL assignment (P=0.008) when comparing the UCLR group to the
control group. The analyzed data shows that the UCLR group allowed 0.07 home runs per
inning (range: 0.02 - 0.20) and had 86.8% of its members return to the “disabled list” (33 of 38
group members). On the other hand, the control group allowed 0.08 home runs per inning
(range: 0.00 - 0.18) and had 64.0% of its members return to the “disabled list” (73 of 114 group
members). Pitchers from the UCLR group averaged fewer home runs per innings pitched but
were more likely to return to the DL/IL for future injuries during their careers. They returned to
the DL/IL due to unspecified elbow injury (15 of 33, 45.5%) or UCL tear or re-tear (4 of 38,
10.5%), but compared to the control group (32 of 73 for elbow, 43.8% and 18 of 114 for UCL,
15.8%), results were indicative but insignificant (P = 0.877 for elbow, P = 0.425 for UCL).
Although the UCLR group had a higher percentage of its members returned to the IL in
their professional careers, a statistic showed that the average number of days spent on the IL by
the UCLR group (103.0) and the control group (94.0) were not as drastic or significant (P=0.316)
as one may assume. Another insignificant finding to note was the comparison of pitch velocities
between groups, where the UCLR group averaged 92.7 ± 2.0 miles per hour against the control
group’s 92.1 ± 2.3 miles per hour (P = 0.148) and reached a maximum velocity of 93.1 ± 2.6
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miles per hour in the UCLR group against 92.4 ± 2.8 miles per hour in the control group (P =
0.257). These results likely indicate that although there is a slight elevation in pitch velocities
between the UCLR and control groups, the P-values may suggest alternative explanations for the
increase in velocity thrown by UCLR pitchers.
Conclusion
The validity of draft order as a predictor of success in Major League Baseball and the
accuracy of the criteria by which a pitcher is drafted in a high round is left to be further
investigated. Pitchers drafted in the first round appeared to have not performed as well as
pitchers drafted in subsequent rounds. The first-round pitchers had increases in statistics where
higher numbers are not favorable and decreases in statistics where lower numbers are not
favorable. However, if a pitcher receives Tommy John surgery prior to being drafted, they are
most likely to return to an injured status while playing in MLB. Contrary to the implications of
Ahmad’s poll results, Tommy John surgery was not conclusively seen to increase fastball
velocity.
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CHAPTER 3: FINANCIAL EARNINGS AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR OF VALUE

Introduction
Like most professional sports, Major League Baseball is a financially demanding
operation organized as a business and as a cog in the entertainment industry. For the main
entertainers, the players, salaries are usually contingent on more than just one aspect of a player.
On the business side of MLB, team owners and general managers have a fiscal scope into the
value of players on their teams. From 2019 to 2021, MLB collectively decreased its total payroll
across all teams by 4% (Brown, 2021). This deficit could be related to MLB shortening the 2020
season from 162 games to 60 games in response to the coronavirus pandemic. However, the
team payrolls should not be considered miniscule. In 2021, the lowest team payroll was
approximately $50.3 million, while 20 teams of 30 total teams had a payroll exceeding $100
million (Brown, 2021).
From the first contract they will sign out of the draft, players in MLB will have their
careers mostly dictated by where they can make the most financial gain from their performance.
Some skeptics could assume that if a player gets paid more, they will perform better, while
others may also assume that a player who performs better will be paid more. From the business
standpoint, it could be the spending trends of teams’ front offices that could dictate how their
players are paid. Negotiations for contracts strengthened in 1966 with the solidification of the
MLB Players Association (MLBPA), a union of players from all active MLB teams that
represents the all the players in business affairs with MLB. Spearheaded by Marvin Miller and
the first MLBPA, the first collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in 1968 raised the minimum
wage of $6,000 to $10,000 for players that year (Normandin, 2018).
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In 2002, Billy Beane, then-general manager of the Oakland Athletics, used sabermetrics
and quantitative analyses to utilize the team’s payroll of around $40 million to perform at a
competitive level while ranking 28th out of 30 teams in overall team payroll (2002 MLB Payrolls
- the Baseball Cube, n.d.). Although Beane is credited with bringing “Moneyball” into public
gaze of popularity, the idea was first developed by the then-general manager of the Athletics,
Sandy Alderson. During his tenure in the 1980s and 1990s, Alderson wanted to rebuild the
Athletics’ minor-league farm system with young talent to have them ready to play for them in
MLB efficiently and effectively. In addition to that, Alderson also utilized the free-agent market
to find low-cost players that may positively contribute to the Athletics’ success.
An article from Bleacher Report summarizes the idea of moneyball as the following
equation: “moneyball equals low cost free agent players plus calling up minor league talent from
one’s farm system, with a hopeful end product of a successful MLB season” (Wright, 2011).
Moneyball challenges the idea that more spending leads to more winning, and it can work for
teams with lower budgets competing against teams with larger budgets. From a performance
standpoint, teams want the most wins. From a financial standpoint, teams want the most wins
while utilizing their budget or payroll the most efficiently. As a professional team sport, MLB
and its teams with smaller markets can utilize moneyball to maximize their value while not
bankrupting their teams.
With building or rebuilding a farm system, team front offices must navigate and interpret
the scouting reports to draft players who can add value to their minor-league affiliates and, in
turn, contribute to the major-league team. Eventually, these minor-league players may graduate
to play in MLB and are then dependent financially on where they play next. It is difficult to
predict how valuable draftees will become and how much they will be worth in a monetary
sense. For the free-agent market, where MLB players once signed to a team contract may now
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receive contractual offers from other teams to play for them, the moneyball approach favors
teams to pick the most cost-effective options that can collectively earn wins rather than sign the
most-expensive star players. The condition of the players, whether their history of injury is
extensive or frequent, can also affect the value of a player and the contracts which they are
offered or can sign.
Review of Literature and Methods
Preliminary analyses by my research team reframed the focus from draft order and
performance to fiscal earnings and performance, running descriptive statistics and frequencies,
this time accounting for pitchers’ wins above average (WAA), wins above replacement (WAR),
and total earnings in millions of dollars (Terra et al., 2022b). WAA defines the wins a player
contributes above the theoretical average player, and the sum of all the players’ WAA values on
a team should closely resemble the team’s final win-loss record (WAA – BR Bullpen, 2020).
Like WAA, WAR calculates the wins a player would contribute over a theoretical “replacementlevel player.” This replacement player would be considered “a AAA-quality player acquired by
a team at any time for the league’s minimum salary” (Wins above Replacement – BR Bullpen,
2020). A positive WAA or WAR value for a player indicates that the player contributed to the
team’s wins, while a negative WAA or WAR value for a player may equate to a player
negatively affecting the team’s wins or towards the team’s losses.
The 1000 subjects were then divided two times for separate analyses. For the first of
these analyses, the pitchers were coded from 1 to 3. Coding numbers were allocated as followed:
1 if the pitcher was drafted prior to the year 2000, 2 if the pitcher was drafted during the years
2000 to 2010, 3 if the pitcher was drafted following the 2010 season. Multiple comparison (MC)
Tukey tests were run on the three groups to compare the means of the individual groups’ WAA
and WAR to the mean WAA and mean WAR of the whole database and the means of each group
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to one another. After that, the subjects who had salary values were divided by salary level into
quintiles of 195 pitchers each, with the fifth quintile having 194. A one-way ANOVA test on the
quintiles compared the means of each quintile based on level of earnings to each other. All
monetary values for the Terra et al. study were adjusted for inflation to their 2019 values.
Since it is a common procedure performed on baseball players, a 2020 study by Dr. Jason
Meldau et al. analyzed the economic effect of Tommy John surgery on MLB pitchers. The data
needed for this study was obtained using public records to identify MLB pitchers who had
undergone the surgery from 2004 to 2014. Inclusion criteria required the pitchers to have played
in one MLB game before the surgery, had the surgery performed between 2004 and 2014, and
had returned to play in at least one MLB or minor-league baseball (MiLB) game following
surgery. Contract information and time used to undergo and recover from the procedure that
they could have played in the regular season were used to evaluate financial loss. Since the data
collection for the study occurred in 2017, fiscal earnings were adjusted for inflation to equate to
2017 value (Meldau et al., 2019).
Results and Discussion
From our findings, 36.2% of the subjects were classified as starting pitchers and 68.5% of
the sample size were right-handed. Subjects were also analyzed by which decade they were
drafted and can be seen in Table 5. The descriptive statistics calculated the averages for the
following categories observed in the study: MLB wins (61.34 ± 54.780), MLB ERA (4.060 ±
0.682), MLB RA9 (4.229 ± 0.719). MLB WAA (2.733 ± 9.038), WAR (11.973 ± 14.740), and
total earnings in millions (27.321 ± 38.628). From Table 5, it can be seen from a percentage
perspective by decade that pitchers drafted in the 2000s comprise more than a quarter of the
subjects (26.7%). For the MC Tukey tests, 604 pitchers were drafted prior to the year 2000, 296
pitchers were drafted during the years of 2000 and 2010, and 100 pitchers were drafted after the

25
2010 season. With significance set at P<0.05, the means for WAA and WAR were calculated
within each of the three groups and are shown in Table 6:

Table 5
Percentages of subjects drafted in each decade, (Terra et al., 2022b)
Decade of
Draft
Total
(n=1000)

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

2010s

5.7%

13.7%

21.0%

20%

26.7%

12.9%

Table 6
WAA and WAR means for the divided sample groups, (Terra et al., 2022b)
2000-2010 (n=296)

After 2010 (n=100)

Significance

MLB WAA

Prior to 2000
(n=604)
3.134 ± 10.215

2.404 ± 7.642

1.289 ± 3.367

P=0.127

MLB WAR

14.599 ± 16.548

9.163 ± 11.245

4.428 ± 4.951

P<0.001

MLB WAA within each group was not found to be significant (P=0.127), but it is noted
that the standard deviations in MLB WAA are almost thrice as large as the calculated means.
With P<0.001, MLB WAR found pitchers drafted prior to 2000 to have the highest average value
and standard deviation (14.599 ± 16.548). The pitchers drafted after 2010 had the lowest
average value, but they also had the lowest standard deviation (4.428 ± 4.951).
The standard deviation values are not as large of a difference compared to the standard
deviation of the MLB WAA, but the WAR standard deviations are still larger in quantity than the
means for WAR. From these means, a pitcher drafted prior to 2000 could have an MLB WAR as
high as 31.147 and as low as -1.949, while a pitcher drafted after 2010 could have an MLB WAR
as high as 9.379 and as low as -0.523. In the context of Table 6’s results, a pitcher drafted before
2000 could add about 31 wins to their team but could also subtract almost two wins or add two
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losses to their team’s record. A pitcher drafted after 2010 could contribute nine wins to their
team’s record or approximately one win against the team’s record.
The linear regressions held “decade of draft” and “total monetary earnings in millions” as
the independent variables. The dependent variables that were observed individually were MLB
WAA and MLB WAR. Significance was set at P<0.001. The results for both regressions can be
seen in Tables 7 and 8. With both linear regression models producing P<0.001, all findings in
these analyses are significant.

Table 7
Linear Regressions of total monetary earnings predicting MLB WAA (Terra et al., 2022b)
Independent variable

Unstandardized β

95% CI (lower to
higher)

P-value

Decade of Draft

-0.631

-0.929 to -0.333

P<0.001

Total Monetary Earnings
in Millions

0.161

0.150 to 0.172

P<0.001

(R2 = 0.475)

Table 8
Linear Regressions of total monetary earnings predicting MLB WAR (Terra et al., 2022b)
Independent variable

Unstandardized β

(R2 = 0.637)

95% CI (lower to

P-value

higher)

Decade of Draft

-3.247

-3.652 to -2.842

P<0.001

Total Monetary Earnings
in Millions

0.287

0.272 to 0.301

P<0.001

For the WAA model, it seems that for every incremental increase in decade of draft,
WAA decreases by 0.631 points on average. For every incremental increase in total monetary
earnings by millions, the WAA increases, on average, by 0.161 points. Although this may
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suggest that more spending contributes to more WAA accrued, the variance or R suggests that
the independent variables account for 47.5% of the results’ variance. This means that 52.5% of
the results’ discrepancies could be explained by other factors. The WAR model’s R2 value
equates to 63.7% of the WAR-model results’ variance is accounted for by draft decade and total
monetary earnings in millions. For every incremental increase in decade of draft, WAR
decreases by 3.247 points, while every increase in total monetary earnings in millions yields
0.287 points of WAR.
When looking at the independent variables of the linear regressions, the decade of draft
negatively affects both WAA and WAR, and the total monetary earnings positively affects both
WAA and WAR. Since it has a higher variance considered for its results, WAR seems to be
more accurate in depicting the effect draft decade and total monetary earnings can have on wins
a player could provide to their team. This is also confirmed by the MC Tukey test results, where
the multiple comparisons analyzing WAA all had insignificant P-values and two of the three
multiple comparisons analyzing WAR had significant P-values.

Table 9
Results of the MC Tukey tests comparing WAA values, (Terra et al., 2022b)
Decade groups being compared
(coded number)
Prior to 2000 (1) vs 2000 – 2010 (2)
Prior to 2000 (1) vs 2010 – present
(3)
2000 – 2010 (2) vs 2010 – present
(3)

Mean difference

P-value

0.7302
1.8449

P=0.490
P=0.141

1.1147

P=0.535

Table 10
Results of the MC Tukey tests comparing WAR values, (Terra et al., 2022b)
Decade groups being compared
(coded number)
Prior to 2000 (1) vs 2000 – 2010 (2)
Prior to 2000 (1) vs 2010 – present
(3)

Mean difference

P-value

5.4363
10.1712

P<0.001
P<0.001
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(Table 10 Continued)
Decade groups being compared
(coded number)
2000 – 2010 (2) vs 2010 – present
(3)

Mean difference
4.7348

P-value
P=0.12

The mean differences between 1 vs 2 and 1 vs 3 differ in significance from the mean
difference of 2 vs 3, as can be seen in Table 10 above. Despite the adjustment for inflation, the
differences could be explained by the trend of MLB teams spending more on player salaries.
Reported numbers from Baseball Almanac show that the difference in minimum wage for MLB
players increased from $6,000 in 1967 to $200,000 in 1999 (Major League Baseball Minimum
Wage | Baseball Almanac, 2022). The same reports show that the period from 2000 to 2010
showed another increase from $200,000 to $400,000 respectively. The scope of the Terra et al.
study, which saw the salary values get adjusted to 2019 value, would define 2011 to 2019 within
group 3’s parameters. Minimum wages from that timeframe would have increased $141,000,
nearing $555,000 by 2019. In 2022, the newest CBA between MLB and the MLBPA granted
raises in minimum wages for MLB players to $700,000 for the 2022 season and are projected to
reach $780,000 by 2026, the last year of the newly negotiated CBA (Brown, 2022).
The one-way ANOVA revealed that salary quintiles had similar win percentages.
Although the difference in win percentage between the highest-earning quintile and lowestearning quintile is roughly 6%, none of the other win percentages differ from within either end of
the range by about 3%. Those results can be seen in Table 11.

Table 11
One-way ANOVA results, win percentage to salary quintiles (Terra et al., 2022b)
Quintile

N

Win Percentage (as a %)

Top (1st) Quintile

195

0.5366047 (53.7%)
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(Table 11 Continued)
Quintile

N

Win Percentage (as a %)

2nd Quintile

195

0.4968045 (49.7%)

Middle (3rd) Quintile

195

0.5019964 (50.2%)

4th Quintile

195

0.4975296 (49.8%)

Bottom (5th) Quintile

194

0.4679400 (46.8%)

Total

974

0.5002081 (50.0%)

With the total win percentage at 50.0% from this test, it is hard to argue if salary earnings
have a significant effect on pitchers’ win percentages. The top quintile of earning does have the
highest win percentage, but the magnitude is marginal when comparing between quintiles. The
argument could be made that more money spent on pitchers equates to more wins contributed,
but since the percentages amongst quintiles are not vastly different, other factors could be
contributing to the correlation of salary earnings and win percentages. As a team sport, pitchers
in MLB are also successful by means of their teams’ respective offensive production and defense
fielding. Some metrics in baseball like fielding-independent pitching (FIP) and adjusted pitching
wins can measure the sole impact a pitcher has on the team’s wins.
Meldau et al. identified 194 pitchers that fit the study’s criteria. Twelve of those pitchers
underwent a revision surgery. Descriptive statistics showed the average age of the sample to be
27.8 ± 4.0 years of age, with the youngest pitcher at 20 years old and the oldest pitcher at 47
years old. The sample contained 92 starting pitchers, 97 relief pitchers, and 17 closers. Of those
pitchers, 154 were right-handed and 52 were left-handed. The league affiliation was split evenly,
with 103 pitchers representing the American League and 103 pitchers representing the National
League. Looking at the surgery numbers by year, 11 total surgeries occurred in 2004 compared
to 30 surgeries in 2014. The highest number of surgeries that took place in one year was 2012
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with 35. Accounting for the revision surgeries, 206 total UCL reconstruction (UCLR) surgeries
were performed in the observed timespan.
Total pitcher salaries were compiled, considering the number of players that earned
certain earning thresholds. Economic losses were analyzed by the type of pitcher and year. All
monetary values were adjusted for inflation to the year 2017.

Table 12
Total MLB pitcher salary and number of players earning at least $1, $5, and $10 million per
year, (Meldau et al., 2019)
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Pitchers

398

400

399

415

426

404

408

408

416

339

418

Total
salary a
Average
salary b
$1million

1.12

1.18

1.25

1.30

1.36

1.37

1.41

1.35

1.48

1.45

1.62

2.81

2.95

3.13

3.14

3.18

3.38

3.45

3.32

3.55

4.28

3.88

155

163

176

180

180

187

190

201

212

207

218

$5million

33

43

53

67

73

67

69

68

79

82

97

$10million

6

8

9

12

17

26

31

28

30

37

41

Note. Reproduced with permission from Dr. Eric Makhni.
a
Values reported in billions of U.S. dollars, accounted for inflation. b Values reported in millions
of U.S. dollars, accounted for inflation.

Table 13
Economic loss by type of pitcher and year (Meldau et al., 2019)
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Starter

0.959

7.840

25.373

40.053

31.398

17.125

7.151

27.399

40.013

29.854

33.936

Relief

2.914

4.768

4.968

3.903

11.203

9.565

4.151

6.209

9.563

17.652

21.040

Closer

0.334

3.929

2.436

8.984

2.328

7.512

12.356

1.932

20.671

6.241

5.251

Total

4.207

16.537

32.777

52.940

44.929

34.202

23.658

35.540

70.247

53.747

60.227

Note. Reproduced with permission from Dr. Makhni.
Values were reported in millions of U.S. dollars, accounted for inflation.
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Total pitcher salaries from Table 12 and economic losses from Table 13 showed upward
trends, illustrating an increase in pitcher pay from 2004 to 2014 and an increase in corresponding
losses as the years progressed. For total MLB pitcher salary, 2013 saw an average salary of
$4.28 million, almost $0.4 million more than the 2014 value of $3.88 million. Between the years
2004 and 2014, the highest points of value in economic loss revolve around 2012, where the
economic loss of starters in millions (40.013), economic loss of closers in millions (20.671), and
total economic loss of pitchers who underwent UCLR (70.247) reach their maximum in the data
set. Despite an average annual increase in salary, pitchers who underwent the procedure lost
more annually.
Conclusion
Financial value of a pitcher is difficult to associate with one factor of a pitcher’s overall
performance. Even though the concept of moneyball has changed the way MLB teams utilize
their payrolls and player management, player salaries have increased as a result of union efforts
to compensate those on the field for their in-season performance. There is a correlation that
points in WAA and WAR increases with total monetary earnings. However, the winning
percentages do not differ as much as one may assume. The annual salary growth and economic
losses experienced by pitchers who had UCLR shows that time away from the pitcher’s mound
has a negative effect on fiscal value of a pitcher. From the studies and articles observed, pitchers
who are paid more may help their team win more games. The caveat of pitching too much to
contribute more wins could place the pitcher at an economic loss should they require Tommy
John surgery. As a pitcher recovered from the surgery during the regular season, the team was
contractually obligated to pay them for that season, despite the pitcher not contributing to the
team’s wins or losses.
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CHAPTER 4: UCL RECONSTRUCTION AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR OF VALUE

Introduction
Despite its novel presence in the history of baseball, Tommy John surgery has become a
procedure synonymous with the sport and has since been a foundational point of contention in its
contributions to pitcher value. If a player receives the surgery before being drafted, it could
affect the order in which that player is drafted, and if a player receives it during their career in
MLB, it could affect how long that player plays for and for how much. An important component
of identifying value in a baseball player is the strength and durability of the player’s
arm. Pitching and throwing a baseball can cause considerable stress to the elbow and, more
specifically, the ulnar collateral ligament (UCL). The ligament allows the throwing arm’s elbow
to be stabilized while absorbing the valgus stress inflicted as the elbow joint is pushed into an
abducted position. If the stress experienced by the throwing elbow exceeds the ligament’s
physiological limit of endurance, injury may occur in the UCL or the elbow (Hibbard et al.,
2015).
On September 25th, 1974, orthopedic doctor Frank Jobe performed a surgery he invented
to reconstruct the UCL with a tendon graft. It was the first UCL reconstruction surgery of that
design to be carried out and would change the course of history in sports medicine and
baseball. The recipient of the surgery, who would later lend his name to the surgery’s nickname,
was Tommy John, a left-handed pitcher who had pitched 12 years prior to his UCL tear. Dr.
Jobe had no definitive answer to whether John would be able to pitch after this surgery but knew
that not performing the surgery would end John’s career.
From Dr. Jobe’s procedural perspective, the surgery consisted of obtaining a tendon graft,
cleaning the joint, and securing the graft within the elbow. The tendon graft may be obtained
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from a donor or from the patient, most likely derived from the palmaris longus of the forearm,
the hamstring tendon, or the big toe extensor tendon. The cleaning of the joint involved moving
muscles and other tissues away from the affected joint and removing any damaged tissues. The
surgeon proceeded to make holes in the humerus and ulna at the UCL’s initial origin and
insertion point. Once completed, the graft was threaded through the holes in the adjacent bones
and secured by sutures or screws. The modern recovery process from UCL reconstruction
surgery involves immobilization followed by months to a couple years of physical therapy and
rehabilitation (Boston Children’s Hospital, 2019). Failure to follow a recovery regimen or
process personally made for the pitcher may result in re-injury or additional surgery.
Implementation of a post-operative recovery program may have stemmed from John’s
initial recovery; scar tissue from his procedure grew over the ulnar nerve of his left arm, causing
involuntary curling of the arm and atrophy. To correct this, Dr. Jobe performed another surgery
to remove the obstructing scar tissue and to reposition the nerve. When John removed his cast in
January 1975 following the two procedures, he found an atrophied arm that would take over a
year to rehabilitate before he returned to the mound on April 16, 1976. Fortunately for both John
and Dr. Jobe, John played for 14 years after his return to play until his retirement in
1989. Although he waited two years before performing his next UCL reconstruction, Dr. Jobe
and his pioneering surgery would assist more than 500 Major League Baseball (MLB) pitchers
repair a strained or torn UCL (Landers, 2019).
Despite this, few investigations have explored the long-term effects of the surgery on the
pitcher’s performance, and preliminary results have often been misinterpreted and associated
with a variety of misconceptions. A collective database on UCL reconstructions found that 78%
of the surgeries performed prior to the end of 2013 returned to play (Roegele, 2015). Between
John’s recovery to the end of 2013, roughly four out of five pitchers who had their UCL
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reconstructed would return to play. The most common misconception is that the surgery will
make you a better pitcher than before the repair. For example, the eponymous pitcher John saw
improvements in most pitching categories. Prior to his surgery, John won 124 wins between
Cleveland, Chicago, and the first half of his Los Angeles’ tenure, averaging 10.3 wins per season
over 12 seasons. However, John’s post-surgery career saw him pitch 14 seasons with Los
Angeles, New York, Anaheim, and Oakland, totaling 164 wins and averaging 11.7 wins per
season (Baseball-Reference.com).
Review of Literature
To assist in the clarification of this misconception, there were a few studies analyzed to
further understand possible explanations as to why these misconceptions about Tommy John
surgery exist. The first study I performed with my team was conducted to evaluate the changes
in pitching performances after the procedure and to identify if there were any distinct beneficial
or detrimental effects on performance post-Tommy John surgery (Wong et al., 2019).
Across the board, not all the pitchers in the database may have experienced the same type
of UCL tear, nor does it mean that every player was subjected to the same surgical procedure or
used the same type of graft to repair the UCL. An additional study from Dr. Nathan Marshall et
al. in 2019 explored how the type of tear, the surgical method, and the type of graft used might
affect post-surgery statistics. The types of UCL tears (proximal, distal, midsubstance) and
degrees to which the UCL had been torn (partially or completely) had the potential to be repaired
using a modified Jobe technique or a docking technique, the latter of which had been the
preferred method since 2013.
The two tendon grafts considered and analyzed in the study were of the palmaris and
gracilis tendons from the forearm and inner thigh, respectively. From 2002 to 2016, 46 primary
UCL reconstructions were performed on MLB pitchers and taken into consideration for this
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study’s focus. Since revision surgeries would add more variance to the type of tear, surgical
procedure, and graft, only primary reconstructions were counted (Marshall et al., 2019).
Methods
In the Wong et al. study, three groups of 50 pitchers in each were analyzed and
compared. The first group (REC) consisted of 50 pitchers who had at least two years playing
before and after undergoing UCL reconstruction surgery. These players were selected from a
publicly available record of pitchers in MLB who are recipients of the surgery. The second
group (INJ) had 50 players who sustained an injury tantamount to the impact of a UCL tear but
did not experience the Tommy John surgery or undergo surgical intervention to heal. The last
group (NON) served as the study’s control group and was composed of 50 players who, as of
2019, had neither received UCL reconstruction surgery nor sustained a major injury similar to a
UCL tear or strain. The latter two groups were picked using similarity scores of REC-group
pitchers (provided by statistician Bill James and Baseball Reference) to find pitchers for the INJ
and NON groups. Players from the INJ and NON groups also had the same play-time
parameters as the first group to ensure a standardized window from which to analyze
performance statistics.
Descriptive statistics identified population means and percentages. Binary variables were
reported as percentages. Continuous variables were reported as means and standard deviations
of the group. Mixed ANOVA with repeated measures and Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were
used to measure the effect of group assignment when comparing statistics from the first and last
seasons of play along with the means of the first two and final two seasons of play; these
statistics included wins, win percentages, strikeouts per inning (K/IP), and earned-run averages
(ERA).

36
The win percentage compared the amount of wins a pitcher has accrued to the total
number of games that a pitcher has decidedly won or lost. Strikeouts per innings pitched (K/IP)
refers to the average number of strikeouts a pitcher pitched over the innings in which they
pitched. Earned-run average (ERA) is calculated by multiplying the number of runs a pitcher has
earned by a factor of nine, and then that product is divided by the number of innings pitched by
the pitcher. These statistics gave each pitcher in the sample size a superficial yet comprehensive
summary of each pitcher’s performances in their given scope or timeframe.
Pitching performance statistics for each subject in the Marshall et al. study were obtained
from the same reference site as the Wong et al. study (Baseball-Reference.com) and additionally
from fangraphs.com. Potential subjects were exempt from the study if the pitcher was a starting
pitcher with fewer than 20 innings pitched in a year or a relief pitcher with fewer than 10 innings
pitched in a year. These parameters were instilled to avoid small sample bias and skewing of the
data. Each player’s MLB statistics for three years before and after the UCL reconstruction were
compiled and included the following categories: games, innings pitched (IP), win percentage,
ERA, walks and hits per innings pitched (WHIP), walks per 9 innings, strikeouts per 9 innings,
fastball velocity, runs above replacement (RAR), and wins above replacement (WAR). Walks
per 9 innings is the average number of walks a pitcher would issue over the course of the length
of a standard game: nine innings. WHIP equates to the sum of a given pitcher’s walks and
strikeouts dealt, divided by the total number of innings that pitcher has pitched.
The term “above replacement” in WAR and RAR refer to a theoretical reference player
that approximates performance based on league averages. When calculating WAR for pitchers,
either runs allowed per 9 innings (RA9) or fielding independent pitching (FIP) is used to
comparatively analyze averages of the league to find how many wins that specific pitcher would
acquire in the number of innings pitched (MLB.com). RAR is a similar metric to WAR,
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replacing wins with runs. A player’s RA9 factors in all runs a pitcher is responsible for, both
earned and unearned. A pitcher may acquire an unearned run if an opposing runner from the
previous pitcher scores or if an error occurs by the pitcher’s defense that allows the opposing
team to score a run. Calculating RA9 is nearly identical to calculating ERA with the addition of
unearned run totals to earned run totals prior to multiplying that sum by the 9-factor and dividing
that product by the innings pitched.
Fielding-independent pitching (FIP) has some parallels to ERA and RA9, but the major
difference is that it only accounts for outcomes for which the pitcher is most responsible. These
outcomes for when the pitcher is most-responsible and are used to calculate FIP involve
strikeouts, unintentional walks, hit-by-pitches, and home runs allowed. Outcomes resulting in
the ball being put into the field of play by the opposing batter are not factored into FIP because
the pitcher is thought to have limited control over the results produced by the fielding defense. A
pitcher with a lower FIP than ERA may indicate that the pitcher’s defense was not helpful in
preventing the opposing runs scored, while a pitcher with a lower ERA than FIP may have had a
defense that saved more runs than the pitcher could have control of preventing. Differences in
ERA and FIP could help quantify the value of a given pitcher with an effective defense and a
pitcher with an ineffective defense.
Results and Discussion
The pitchers in the Wong et al. study measured at 74.9 ± 2.4 inches, BMI of 26.8 ± 2.2
kg/m , and played 10.5 ± 4.5 years. From the whole sample, almost all the pitchers played 8.2 ±
2

4.8 years pre-injury while a little more than half of the sample (N = 82) played 4.2 ± 3.5 years
post-injury. Of these pitchers, 67.34% of them currently are or were starting pitchers and
71.34% of them currently are or were right-handed pitchers. Spanning the entire careers of the
subjects in the sample size, changes in wins and WAR (wins above replacement) yielded
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negative results (-0.04 ± 0.16 wins and -3.6 ± 8.5 WAR respectively), while changes in ERA
(0.13 ± 1.6) and strikeouts (0.03 ± 0.18) yielded positive results (Wong et al., 2019).

Table 14
Descriptive statistics of entire sample, (Wong et al., 2019)

Multiple linear regression models with a P-value set at P<0.05 were used to determine the
effect that UCL reconstruction had on pre- to post-injury changes between the first and last
seasons’ statistics and the first-two and last-two seasons’ statistics. Confounding variables held
constant for these analyses included years post-injury, total years active, and BMI. From the first
two seasons, pitchers won 14.6 ± 7.8 games per season with a winning percentage of
53.6%. They totaled an ERA of 4.01 ± 1.14 ERA and struck out 0.88 ± 0.23 batters per
inning. The more significant results involve the change in winning percentage between the first
and last seasons and the winning percentage between the averages of the first two and last two
seasons (P=0.026 and P=0.017 respectively). The following linear regressions analyzed the
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changes in performance statistics from the first and last seasons of each subject in the sample.
Potential confounding variables were held constant.

Tables 15-18
Results of linear regression models used to determine the effect of UCL reconstruction on firstlast season statistic (Wong et. al, 2019)

From the first and last seasons, the only significant finding of note was the 14.4
percentage-point change in win percentage between the first and last season for players who
underwent Tommy John surgery in the REC group (P=0.026). In the same analysis, the players
in the INJ group underwent a decrease of 2.9 percentage points in their win percentages
(P=0.007). Linear regressions were also used to compare statistics between the sample groups’
first-two and last-two seasons of play, holding confounding variables constant.
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Tables 19-20
Results of linear regression models used to determine the effects of UCL reconstruction on firsttwo and last-two season statistics, win percentages and wins (Wong et al., 2019)

Although the regression models from the first-two and last-two seasons did not show any
significant changes in the REC group, the decrease in win percentage of 1.9 percentage points
(P=0.017) showed that INJ-group pitchers did not have a higher win percentage in their first two
seasons or last two seasons. Changes in ERA and strikeout numbers from the first-two and lasttwo seasons are reported in Tables 21 and 22, despite there being no significant results from
those models:

Tables 21-22
Results of linear regression models used to determine the effects of UCL reconstruction on firsttwo and last-two season statistics, ERA and strikeouts (Wong et al., 2019)
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Based off the analyses and research done on this small sample size, it appeared that UCL
reconstruction did not compromise pitching quality in a significantly positive or negative
way. The mixed ANOVAs found no statistical differences between the REC group, the INJ
group, and the NON group, while the linear regressions predicted minimal changes in pitching
performances between pitchers in the pre- and post-operational phases of UCL reconstruction
(Wong et al., 2019). The results of this study should not be a definitive conclusion, as the data
did not include physiological effects or mechanical parameters like the likelihood of UCL reinjury in past patients (leading to a revision of the UCL reconstruction) or differences in
rehabilitation programs.
Pitchers in the Marshall et al. study were analyzed according to the performance
outcomes, with results being grouped into each factor of Tommy John surgery that was being
evaluated. Time (in years) pre- and postoperative were reported as means, while continuous
variables were represented as means with standard deviations and percentages. Comparison of
means underwent t-test analysis, significance set at P < 0.05. Descriptive statistics from the
study are summarized in the following table:

Table 23
Pitcher Descriptives (Marshall et al., 2019)
Category

Mean

Age

26.3 ± 4.5

Right-handed, Mean ± n (%)

31 (67)

Starting pitcher, Mean ± n (%)

27 (59)

Time to return from surgery (in months), Mean ± SD
(range)

13.7 (10-23)

Return to play (n=45), Mean ± n (%)

43 (96)

Return to MLB (n=44), Mean ± n (%)

36 (82)

Note. N=46. Reproduced with permission from Dr. Nathan Marshall.

42
Noting the last two categories in the table above, one player in the sample size was still
listed on the DL/IL for UCL reconstruction (n=45) and two players had either still been listed on
the DL/IL, reassigned to minor-league rehabilitation, or received the surgery while playing in the
minor leagues (n=44). When analyzing the sample grouped by procedural strategy (docking and
modified Jobe), players who underwent the modified Jobe technique pitched longer in MLB than
those who underwent the docking technique (3.4 years vs 1.1 years respectively, P = 0.001).
Compared to the docking group, subjects in the modified Jobe group pitched in more
games preoperatively (32.6 vs 20.6 games, P = 0.024) and walked more batters post-operative
(3.7 vs 2.8 walks, P = 0.044). Other results from this grouping analysis were found to be
insignificant. In the scope of graft type, the palmaris graft group was younger than the gracilis
graft group (25.7 vs 28.4 years, P = 0.043) and weighed more than the gracilis graft group (98.4
vs 93.0 kg, P = 0.032). Post-operative playing time was shown to be greater in the palmaris
group (5.2 vs 2.7 years, P = 0.007) with the significant finding being time in the minors (MiLB)
and MLB to be longer from the palmaris group (2.5 years vs 0.7 years in MiLB, P = 0.015).
Organizing the subject groups by location of the tear (distal, proximal, or midsubstance)
and degree of the tear (partial or complete) yielded more performance-based differences between
categories in each classification of scope, with significance set for both at P<0.05. For tear
location, the following t-test results from the study are presented here:

Table 24
Significant relationship between difference of performance statistics and tear location (Marshall
et al., 2019)
Category of Statistic
Pre-op fastball velocity, miles
per hour

Proximal tear
(n=16)

Distal tear (n=24)

Midsubstance
tear (n=3)

P Value

90.6

93.0

N/A

0.023

Note. Reproduced with permission from Dr. Nathan Marshall.
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(Table 24 Continued)
Category of Statistic

Proximal tear
(n=16)

Distal tear (n=24)

Midsubstance
tear (n=3)

P Value

Pre-op ERA

5.11

3.93

3.51

0.003

Pre-op WHIP

1.47

1.32

1.25

0.021

Pre-op strikeouts per 9 innings

6.6

8.3

6.3

0.016

Pre-op WAR

0.1

0.9

1.4

0.017

Pre-op RAR

2.1

9.3

13.7

0.016

Post-op win percentage

58.3

42.4

48.9

0.029

Post-op IP

58.9

97.9

84.6

0.042

Note. Reproduced with permission from Dr. Nathan Marshall.

Considering the differences in sample size, the midsubstance-tear group (n=3) showed
better results in only preoperative statistics (ERA, WHIP, WAR, and RAR) over the proximaltear group or the distal-tear group, which would indicate that the midsubstance-tear group had a
significantly greater performance between groups prior to Tommy John surgery. Among the
groups, the distal-tear group led in pre-op fastball velocity, pre-op strikeouts per nine innings,
and post-op innings pitched. On average, this group pitched faster and pitched more strikeouts
before the surgery but pitched more innings after receiving the surgery. The only notable
statistic that the proximal-tear group had the superior value was in post-op win percentage,
which notes that when looking at all the groups, the proximal-tear group would win more after
repairing the UCL than the others.

Table 25
Significant relationship between difference of performance results and type of tear (Marshall et
al., 2019)
Category of statistic
Years post-surgery, total

Complete tear (n=14)
5.9

Partial tear (n=32)
4.0

P value
0.033
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(Table 25 Continued)
Category of statistic

Complete tear (n=14)

Partial tear (n=32)

P value

Years post-surgery, minors

3.1

1.7

0.028

ERA, pre-surgery

3.82

4.70

0.041

WHIP, post-surgery

1.27

1.41

0.037

Strikeouts per 9 innings, postsurgery

8.9

7.0

0.025

Note. Reproduced with permission from Dr. Nathan Marshall.

When looking at the results comparing types of tears to performance-based results, t-tests
found that pitchers with a complete tear had a lower average ERA before reconstruction (3.82)
than pitchers with a partial tear before surgery (4.70, P=0.041). The other significant results
showed that pitchers who suffered a complete tear and returned to surgery played more years
overall, more years in the minors, and yielded better post-surgery statistics in WHIP and
strikeouts per 9 innings than those who returned from surgery to repair a partial tear. The
increase of playing time in the minor leagues could be part of the rehabilitation program for
pitchers who played in MLB while suffering the UCL tear, as pitchers recovering from the
surgery would need time to test out the arm once it had been cleared for physical activity.
Some evidence has been provided by a study from Dr. Joseph Liu et al. regarding the
revision rate of UCL reconstruction. 235 MLB pitchers between 1999 to 2014 have undergone
Tommy John surgeries. Within that sample size, 31 pitchers (13.2%) underwent revision surgery
and 37% underwent revision within three years or less after the initial procedure. Of those
pitchers that had a revision surgery, 65.4% (17 pitchers) of that sub-sample returned to pitch at
least one game at the Major-League level, while 43.2% (11 pitchers) returned to pitch 10 or more
games. From that group, the average recovery time was 20.76 months.
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Pitchers recovering from revision surgery that returned to MLB performance played
significantly less time post-revision surgery. With significance set as P < 0.05, pitchers that
underwent revision procedures pitched 2.6 seasons compared to those who just had an initial
UCL reconstruction, who played an average 4.9 seasons (P=0.002). Revised pitchers also
showed significant signs of pitching fewer innings (36.95 innings vs 83.97 innings, P=0.012) and
throwing fewer pitches (635.72 pitches vs 1355.98 pitches, P=0.016) than those who only had an
initial Tommy John surgery with no revisional follow-up (Liu et al., 2016).
When analyzing these studies, there is ambiguous evidence supporting both sides of the
argument that Tommy John surgery improves or worsens pitcher performance. Depending on
which study is being analyzed, there are positive and negative results for pitchers before and
after TJS. The Liu et al. study shows that more than a third of pitchers who receive UCL
reconstruction will likely have another corrective surgery operated on them, and from that group
comes shortened career longevity in MLB. Marshall et al. showed that Tommy John surgery had
statistical improvements depending on the type and location of the UCL tear, what kind of graft
and technique used to repair the tear. Conversely, my study showed that other than having a
higher winning percentage from the first/last seasons and first-two/last-two seasons, there are not
many significant differences between pitchers before and after UCL reconstruction (Wong et al.,
2019).
Conclusion
From preliminary analyses of the literature, it is difficult to definitively state if UCL
reconstruction surgery is beneficial or detrimental to a pitcher’s value. Despite the few
significant findings across the existing studies, there are still many insignificant findings that
would require further research to validate or invalidate. The location of the tear on the UCL and
the degree to which the UCL is torn can affect the postoperative results based on the placement
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and the severity of the tear. If a pitcher suffers damage to the UCL, surgery is recommended if
the pitcher wants to continue a career in professional baseball but should also be cognizant of the
additional risks and likelihood or undergoing corrective surgery.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

In MLB, pitcher value is a value that lends contribution from many variables in baseball,
on and off the field. For the context of this thesis, pitcher value is defined by the positive
contributions a pitcher has for their team and their wins. Between the three variables of pitcher
value analyzed, the effect of Tommy John surgery (TJS) or UCL reconstruction seems to have
the most prevalence on pitcher value and its comprising factors. In draft-order, TJS seemed to
have as much of a significant effect as if a pitcher was drafted in the first round. When analyzed
in the scope of pre-draft value, pitchers who underwent the procedure before being drafted had a
higher likelihood of returning to the disabled/injured list. This may weigh negatively against a
pitcher’s perceived draft value and result in that pitcher being drafted in a lower slot.
Additionally, performance statistics from pitchers drafted in the first round do not differ as
drastically or significantly from performance statistics of pitchers drafted in successive rounds.
Further research would have to be done regarding the accuracy of projecting future success and
positive value in MLB with draft-round status. This may also include evaluating the metrics in
which pitchers are scouted and weighed in the draft.
From the financial scope, pitchers who are recovering from TJS yield an average
economic loss for their teams. Accounting for inflation and the increasing minimum wage of
MLB pitchers, fiscal value of a pitcher quantified by WAA and WAR, has some positive
correlation with salary dollars paid. Although it suggests that investing in pitchers can add to a
team’s cumulative win totals, the individual winning percentages do not vary as drastically when
observing them as a dependent variable against salary paid to those pitchers. On the other hand,
TJS represented an economic loss to pitchers and their respective teams. Those teams with
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pitchers recovering from TJS are essentially paying for the pitchers to rehabilitate and not
directly paying for the pitchers to add to the teams’ wins.
When looking at the performance-based statistics from pitchers who underwent TJS, each
variable affected by TJS yields a different outcome that cannot be summarized as having an
overall positive or negative effect on pitcher value. Whether it is the physiological variables
affected by TJS as observed in Marshall et al.’s study or variables pertaining to preoperative and
postoperative performance statistics like Wong et al.’s study, TJS is neither purely beneficial nor
purely detrimental to overall pitcher value in MLB. TJS does have a negative influence when
analyzing its effects against draft order and fiscal impact, which in turn can equate to an overall
negative impression on a pitcher’s win-based value. However, further research observing TJS as
a sole factor of positive or negative influence on pitcher value would have to be done for a
conclusive indication.
Observing these three variables and their contributions to an MLB pitcher’s win-based
value, all three have strong influences in the resulting totality of value. TJS status has a slightly
negative influence on both draft order and monetary earnings but can also have some benefits in
preserving career longevity, as seen with the case of the eponymous Tommy John. More
research with respect to each variable’s individual compositional factors should be utilized to
fortify one’s argument. As the current literature stands, no single variable can solely determine a
pitcher’s win-value and overall contributions to overall success. It is within each variable to
have a positive or negative effect pending on what subcategory is analyzed.
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